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A series of protests, demonstrations, strikes 
and political violence can, if conditions are 
right, gradually turn into social unrest. Social 
unrest can take the form of peaceful, disruptive 
or violent demonstrations, strikes, and acts 
of political or civil violence.1 Ultimately, social 
unrest can be viewed as an expression of 
collective dissatisfaction with a political system. 
Protest is therefore a form of political 
participation. A society’s preference for the 
use of more conventional forms of political 
High levels of socio-economic dissatisfaction, persistent service delivery issues and increased 
political contestation necessitate closer monitoring of protest action. This article focuses on where 
and why protests happen. The findings draw on data collected by the Institute for Security Studies 
through its Protest and Public Violence Monitor (PPVM). Unlike other reporting systems, which 
tend to focus on specific types of protest, the PPVM seeks to provide comprehensive coverage 
and mapping of all forms of protest, including industrial strike action as well as political and group 
conflict. The findings highlight the wide-ranging nature of protests and illustrate how patterns of 
protests form over time in specific places. The article concludes by reflecting on how research 
into protest should not limit itself in scope. The ultimate aim of the research should be to inform 
the development of more appropriate responses by various role players to prevent violence and to 
encourage peaceful protests.
participation (such as democratic processes) 
can, over time, transform into unconventional 
political participation like violent protest 
or political violence. What is considered 
conventional across the world not only depends 
on the period in time in which it takes place, 
but also on the geographic location, and that 
particular society’s definition of what is socially 
acceptable. Perceptions of what is legitimate 
political action can change, either as satisfaction 
with the state changes or as a growing number 
of citizens believe that peaceful protest or voting 
in elections are ineffective at raising their issues 
and achieving their goals.2 
Recent research by Bohler-Muller et al.3 into 
attitudes towards different forms of protest 
in South Africa suggests that disruptive and 
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even violent protest may be becoming more 
acceptable, given that a growing number of 
South Africans believe these forms of protest 
yield more successful results than peaceful 
protest action. According to this research, 
perceptions are also linked to when and how 
authorities react to various forms of protest.4
Existing research also illustrates that social 
unrest can build up over time.5 The period 
preceding unrest is characterised by action 
and inaction on the part of protestors and 
the authorities, and this may contribute to 
events escalating from protest activities into 
violence. For example, groups may express 
dissatisfaction through petitions and picketing. 
If satisfactory responses are not forthcoming 
from authorities, these groups may decide to 
mobilise and protest. If authorities turn down a 
request to protest and the police use forceful 
measures to disperse the group, the peaceful 
protest may escalate into violence.6 
The research by Schroeter et al. further 
suggests that measuring a wide range of protest 
activities will provide a useful mechanism to 
monitor changes in the nature and extent of 
protest. Keidel measures the intensity of social 
unrest by the number of demonstrations, riots, 
armed infringements and strikes within a year.7 
This broad definition offered by Keidel provides 
a useful way to operationalise the measurement 
of protest in South Africa, which then allows 
us to quantify whether protest events have 
increased in intensity over time. 
However, while the scale of a protest is 
important, deploying the appropriate responses 
to curb escalation will require that we monitor 
not only the frequency of protests but also the 
nature of the grievances being expressed and 
the places where protests are located. This 
article will focus on the types of grievances that 
give rise to protest action and describes the 
location of protests, using data collected as part 
of the Institute for Security Studies’ (ISS) Protest 
and Public Violence Monitoring Project (PPVM).
Protest and Public Violence 
Monitoring project
In 2013, the ISS developed a database of 
crowd-based events that aimed to monitor 
the frequency, location, nature and extent 
of collective action activities taking place in 
South Africa.8 The database also seeks to 
track all forms of peaceful protest, crowd-
based disruptions and violence occurring in 
public places. The PPVM collects information 
on community protest events of various kinds: 
protests against municipalities and other 
public sector services, industrial strike action, 
protests against crime, protests against private 
sector practices, and party-political protests. 
The system also monitors forms of violence 
associated with protest action as well as 
vigilantism, xenophobia, political conflict and 
other forms of crowd or inter-group activity. 
Collecting better information on protest and 
related trends and on the nature and extent 
of this complex phenomena has the potential 
to contribute to an improved understanding 
of the nature, scale and patterns of collective 
action. This in turn can foster the development 
of more appropriate responses by state and 
non-state role players, most notably the police, 
municipalities, community and political leaders, 
and protest organisers,9 because they are better 
able to take into account current political and 
class struggles. 
Methodology
The PPVM’s data is collected by scrutinising 
reports from more than 100 local, national 
and international online news sources as well 
as newsletters and notices by trade unions, 
political parties, and universities.
Incidents that are captured by the database 
include industrial strike action, vigilantism and 
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political attacks – activities which normally fall 
outside the scope of protest analysis. However, 
the broad scope employed by the PPVM 
allows for an interesting analysis of the scale of 
collective action. This scope is aligned with the 
definition of social unrest by Schroeter et al., 
which includes events linked not only to 
civil protest but also to strikes and political and 
civil violence.10
The data capturing instrument collects 
information on more than 30 grievance 
types. For the purpose of this analysis, these 
grievances have been categorised into 13 broad 
categories, which span the spectrum from 
private sector services, corruption, housing/
land and transport, to xenophobia. The working 
definitions for each category are available in 
Appendix 1. 
Relying on media reports alone poses 
substantial limitations. Firstly, not all incidents 
of public violence are reported in the media. 
Analysis by the University of Johannesburg 
estimates that only one in four events are 
reported in the media.11 Moreover, media 
reports tend to contain few facts about the 
exact nature of the event and its causes, and 
the extent to which there was violence or not. 
For instance, community-level protests are often 
reported as ‘service delivery’ protests but the 
exact grievances (that is, whether the protest 
is over water, electricity, housing, etc.) are not 
specified. Furthermore, reports may not focus 
on the primary grievances that led to a protest, 
but may highlight only the escalation into 
violence. For example, reports will cover attacks 
on businesses owned by foreign nationals 
during protest action, but not the original 
protest or, in some cases, the fact that local 
businesses were also targeted.12
As media organisations are typically based in 
metros and large cities, the coverage of events 
in those areas will be greater than in smaller 
towns and rural areas. In addition, coverage 
may differ from province to province, for the 
same reason.13 Lastly, media reports in various 
languages are not necessarily available online.14 
The PPVM treats events as violent when they are 
described as such in the media and if, based on 
the reported facts, an incident may contravene 
the provisions of the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act and involve a criminal act of violence. The 
definition of protest also allows for the inclusion 
of events where violence is initiated not only by 
protestors but also by other parties such as law 
enforcement agencies or other groups.
The PPVM provides an open source, 
virtually real-time, geo-referenced record of 
a comprehensive list of crowd or collective 
actions that have the potential to escalate into 
disruptions or violence. An interactive map of 
all events is displayed online on the ISS’s Crime 
and Justice Information and Analysis Hub at 
https://issafrica.org/crimehub/.
The PPVM is by no means the only protest 
database available. The section below examines 
several other data collection efforts aimed at 
measuring and understanding protest, and 
discusses how these differ from the PPVM.
How do other measures of 
protest differ?
An increase in protests in recent years has 
sparked new research interest into the topic. 
Yet, the currently available sources of information 
vary greatly because of different data collection 
methodologies, counting rules, scope and 
variance in the definitions that they apply. 
Arguably the most comprehensive source 
of protest or crowd gathering data in South 
Africa is that recorded by the South African 
Police Service’s (SAPS) Incident Registration 
Information System (IRIS). This system is 
designed to capture crowd management 
activities and interventions by the Public 
Order Policing Units (POP units) during all types 
of crowd events.
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A summary of the latest IRIS data is contained 
in the SAPS annual report. The 2016/17 annual 
report noted that the SAPS monitored 14 693 
‘crowd-related incidents’ (including sports, 
recreational, religious and cultural events) 
between April 2016 and March 2017.15 Three-
quarters of these events (n=10 978) were 
described as ‘peaceful-related’ incidents with 
the remaining 3 715 events (25%) termed as 
‘unrest-related’ incidents.16 This represents 
a 10% increase in the percentage of ‘unrest-
related’ incidents since 2013/14.
The Centre for Social Change (CSC) at the 
University of Johannesburg accessed the IRIS 
data for the period 1997 to 2013 through a 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 
application.17 After an in-depth analysis of the 
IRIS data, it concluded that these ‘unrest-
related’ incidents are not necessarily all violent 
but are labelled as ‘unrest-related’ because 
they required ‘interventions’ by the POP units. 
These interventions included actions such 
as directing or dispersing a crowd through 
the use of various crowd control techniques, 
including (often controversial) non-lethal crowd 
management equipment such as tear gas, stun 
grenades, rubber bullets and water cannons, or 
making arrests.18 Any crowd event not requiring 
intervention is regarded as peaceful.19 
The 10% increase in the number of ‘unrest-
related’ incidents over the four years since 
2013/14 may well require a more nuanced 
analysis than merely equating this figure to an 
increase in the frequency of protest. This rise 
may rather be the result of the re-establishment 
of more POP units and the acquisition of 
more equipment in recent years. For example, 
by 2015/16, the SAPS had 28 POP units 
consisting of 4 617 operational members and 
support personnel. In 2016/17, the number 
increased by almost 9% in a single year to 
5 025 members.20 This represents a 94% 
increase from the 2 595 members and 23 units 
in 2006.21 Following the closing of many POP 
units by 2006, the IRIS data showed significant 
decreases in recorded incidents, attributed 
to the decreased capacity of the units.22 The 
increase in units since 2013 has led to a greater 
capacity for (and therefore probability of) 
intervention by the SAPS, which, coupled with 
improved IRIS record keeping, has increased 
the frequency of protests on the IRIS database. 
The increase is therefore not merely a reflection 
of an increase in the actual number of public 
assemblies or protests.23 
IRIS data entry practices remain fairly 
arbitrary and uneven due to the absence of 
enforced uniform protocols, definitions and 
categorisations.24 Furthermore, transparency in 
data collection practices is limited because the 
SAPS only releases the details of the events in 
instances where PAIA applications are made. 
Besides IRIS there are several research 
organisations that capture protest action 
through media reporting. For ease of 
comparison, Table 1 provides a summary of 
the scope of events covered by these data 
collection efforts. The table also shows the 
reported frequency of events estimated by each 
database over the last six years (2012 to 2017). 
There are clear differences in the data. The CSC 
(in a separate study to its in-depth analysis 
of the SAPS’s IRIS data) collected 3 526 
media-reported community protests (MRCPs) 
between 2005 and 2017, including all types 
of community protests and not only service 
delivery protests aimed at municipalities. This 
database showed 375 incidents for 2017.25 
In contrast, Municipal IQ, a web-based data 
and intelligence service, focuses on municipal-
level service delivery protests and publishes the 
Municipal Hotspots Monitor. Since 2004, the 
Monitor has collected data on ‘major protests 
staged by community members (who can be 
identified as living in a particular ward) against a 
municipality, as recorded by the media (or other 
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public domain sources such as SAPS press 
releases)’.26 Because of the narrow scope, the 
frequency of events is lower than that captured 
by the CSC and PPVM. In 2014 the Monitor 
recorded 191 protests, which decreased 
to 164 and 137 protests in 2015 and 2016 
respectively.27 It recorded a slight increase in 
2017, to 152 protests.28
The Civic Protest Barometer has also monitored 
trends relating to protest action at a municipal 
level since 2007.29 The Barometer is a project 
of the Dullah Omar Institute at the University of 
the Western Cape.30 Similar to Municipal IQ’s 
data, the 2016 Barometer analysis shows that 
the number of ‘civil protests’ displayed marked 
increases in 2014 with 176 incidents, before 
decreasing again in 2015 to 126 incidents. 
The Barometer recorded the highest number 
of incidents in a single year in 2009, with 204 
incidents.31 However, overall, it records slightly 
fewer incidents than Municipal IQ. 
With the exception of the IRIS database and the 
PPVM, none of the local data recording efforts 
covers a broad definition of protests or incidents 
of public violence. These organisations measure 
either community-level protests or those 
targeting municipalities. Jane Duncan notes 
that ‘the inherent assumption that community 
protests are largely aimed at local government 
failure, ignores the service delivery complexities 
and varying service delivery mandates of 
different spheres of government’.32 
International data collection efforts also maintain 
a wide scope. One example is the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED). ACLED describes its initiative as ‘a 
disaggregated conflict collection, analysis and 
crisis mapping project. ACLED collects the 
Organisation Focus area 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Centre for Social 
Change, 
University of 
Johannesburg 
(CSC)
All ‘community’ 
protests
471 322 375 343 377 375
Municipal IQ Protests against 
local government 
173 155 191 164 137 152
Civic Protest 
Barometer (CPB), 
University of the 
Western Cape
‘Civil’ protests 
against local 
government
150 140 176 126 Not 
available
Not 
available
Armed Conflict 
Location and 
Event Data Project 
(ACLED) 
‘Political violence 
and protest’, 
including political 
mass events such 
as campaign 
rallies 
1 060 1 045 1 084 1 487 1 418 1 026
Social Conflict 
Analysis Database 
(SCAD)
‘Social and 
political disorder’
825 617 757 938 979 Not 
available
Table 1: Protest numbers by various organisations, 2012 to 2017 (media reported)
Source: CSC (2018), Municipal IQ (2016), CPB (2016), ACLED (2018).
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dates, actors, types of violence, locations, 
and fatalities of all reported political violence 
and protest events across Africa, South Asia, 
South East Asia and the Middle East.’33 The 
Social Conflict Analysis Database of the Robert 
S Strauss Center at the University of Texas is 
affiliated to ACLED.34 It covers similar incidents 
in Central and South America, the Caribbean 
and Africa. The data is available for the period 
1990 to 2016. 
Similar to the PPVM, the ACLED database 
covers a wide range of protest action as well 
as forms of political mobilisation and violence 
(including police and other state action against 
civilians or battles for territory, political rallies 
and other political assemblies) since 1997.35 
However, ACLED differs from the PPVM and 
most local databases in the way it counts a 
single event. According to ACLED’s counting 
rules, protracted events are counted multiple 
times in the database, as each day is counted 
as a single event for as long as each event 
continues. So, for example, a three-day 
#FeesMustFall protest action will be counted 
as three entries. For this reason, the number 
of events captured by ACLED is higher than 
that recorded in the PPVM. In 2017, it recorded 
1 026 events of which 935 were described 
as riots or protests.36 A growing number of 
total protest days may well be an indicator of 
growing social unrest. However, the main aim 
of the PPVM is to measure the number and 
nature of distinct geographic events, rather than 
to produce an estimate of the number of total 
protest days alone. 
Comparatively, the publicly available 
international data and IRIS cover a wider range 
of incidents than other databases, but the 
counting rules vary greatly from other local 
efforts. The PPVM covers a wide spectrum of 
events and has similar counting rules to local 
databases. Except for ACLED and the PPVM, 
none of the other databases offers freely 
available data, has a sufficiently wide scope, 
or provides the nuanced detail required to 
undertake an in-depth analysis on the location 
of protests, the number of protests over time 
in similar locations, or the socio-economic 
grievances leading to protests.37 Furthermore, 
there is also no agreement across the 
databases on what actions should be regarded 
as violent, disruptive or peaceful.
Key findings of the PPVM
Frequency of protest
Between January 2013 and December 2017, 
4 391 incidents of protest and collective 
violence were recorded on the PPVM. Figure 1 
provides a breakdown of all recorded events on 
the database per year since 2013. 
The figure above shows that most incidents 
of protest and industrial strike action occurred 
in 2013, followed closely by 2014, a national 
election year. Substantial decreases in protest 
action were recorded in 2015 and 2016, despite 
the rise of education-related protest, most 
notably through the #FeesMustFall movement in 
2016 and the local government elections. 
Further analysis shows that these decreases 
at the national level were driven mainly by 
decreases in the levels of protest in Gauteng. 
This may be due to government interventions 
in place at the time that may have mitigated the 
impetus for protest, such as the formation of 
Figure 1: PPVM incident trends per year  
 from January 2013 to December  
 2017 (n=4391)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
1 191 1 138
527 634
901
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2017) https://issafrica.org/
crimehub/maps/public-violence
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task teams to address community grievances. 
One such initiative, the Ntirhisano community 
outreach programme in Gauteng, aimed to 
foster trust and confidence in government by 
improving service delivery and accountability.38 
To date, the success of this programme is 
unclear and further research is required to 
understand the effectiveness of this programme 
in terms of its implementation and impact. 
Between 2016 and 2017 the frequency of 
protest events increased by 42%. This may be 
related to the change in government in two of 
the main metropolitan areas in Gauteng after the 
2016 elections, which may have reversed the 
public’s positive view of the initiatives described 
above, as the effectiveness of these initiatives 
became strained due to a change in dynamics 
between the various spheres of government.  
Seasonality of protest
The seasonality of protest is clearly depicted in 
the monthly trends presented in Figure 2. The 
number of incidents recorded in the first six 
months of 2017 surpassed the total number of 
all incidents in 2015. Thereafter, the numbers 
decreased quite substantially in the second half 
of the year. Traditionally, events peak around 
May to September each year and start dropping 
after October. December typically has the 
fewest incidents. 
There are a number of possible explanations 
for these patterns. May is widely regarded 
as the start of ‘strike season’, as new salary 
negotiation processes commence across 
the country, during which wage disputes are 
declared between employers and their workers. 
Some of these processes lead to protracted 
negotiations and sporadic strikes across various 
industries, which continue for much of the 
South African winter months.39 
The data shows that all types of protest peak 
during this period, not only labour-related 
industrial strike action. The winter months, 
which bring with them cold weather and 
increased vulnerability for many South Africans, 
Figure 2: PPVM trends per month between 2013 and December 2017 (n=4391)
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2017).
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seem to amplify the urgency for the delivery 
of services such as electricity and housing. 
These months thus see an increase in the 
number of protests. 
The marked drop in the December period 
coincides with the closure of industries and 
schools in South Africa between mid-December 
and mid-January for the so-called ‘festive 
season’, when many potential grievance makers 
and service delivery agents are on leave and 
travel for the holidays. 
Types of protest
The PPVM classifies each incident of protest 
action according to the crowd’s main grievance, 
as identified in the media or other online 
source.40 A breakdown of these main grievance 
categories is contained in Figure 3. 
Analysis of the data shows that most collective 
action between 2013 and 2017 has not been 
focused on highlighting the problems with 
municipal service delivery, but was more often 
related to industrial strike action (comprising 
19% of all events.) 
The second most recorded grievance 
category (accounting for 16% of incidents) 
consisted of grievances about the police’s 
inability to reduce crime levels or to solve 
particular crimes.41 
Protests around municipal services made up 
the third most recorded grievance category, 
contributing a further 16% of protest incidents. 
Twelve per cent of the protests recorded by 
PPVM were education-related, which included 
grievances concerning basic as well as tertiary 
education (including #FeesMustFall). 
A further 11% of the protests or crowd events 
related to politics or elections. Other prominent 
protest concerns related, among others, to 
housing and/or land, transport, other socio-
economic rights, xenophobia and corruption, 
and unfair business practices. 
Further analysis of the data shows that protest 
incidents are frequently organised to express 
dissatisfaction with more than one grievance 
issue. For example, municipal service delivery 
protests may be focused on water and 
Figure 3: Protest types between 2013 and 2017 (n=4391)
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2017).
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electricity delivery, and may raise problems 
regarding either terms of quality or quantity of 
services, or both. 
The findings about overall grievance type are 
important because they illustrate clearly that 
most grievances do not relate to municipal 
service delivery specifically, but are rather an 
indictment of government services in general. 
Of particular concern is the large proportion of 
protests against the police and/or crime, and 
against the departments of basic and 
higher education. 
Beyond basic municipal service delivery, 
the majority of protests illustrate the daily 
struggles of ordinary people to access their 
constitutionally protected socio-economic 
rights, such as access to jobs, fair wages, 
safety, decent education and transport. This 
includes grievances aimed at the private sector, 
although these were not nearly as prominent as 
grievances aimed at the state.
The sheer scale of protest aimed at this wide 
range of issues provides justification for the 
need to widen the scope of study to include 
all types of protest away from a narrow focus 
on ‘service delivery’, ‘municipal services’ and 
‘community protest’.
Violent protests
More than half (55%) of the incidents captured 
on the PPVM were termed ‘violent’ or 
‘disruptive’ in media reports. The proportion 
of violent or disruptive incidents per year has 
been increasing year on year from 43% in 2013 
to 65% in 2016, as Figure 4 below illustrates. 
It is interesting to note, however, that the 
percentage of violent or disruptive incidents 
recorded in the first six months of 2017 is lower 
than in 2015 and 2016. 
It is often difficult to clearly establish from media 
reports whether incidents are violent or simply 
disruptive. It is also difficult to know when 
the status of an incident may shift from being 
peaceful or disruptive into one that is violent. 
Yet, the distinction between what is regarded 
as violent or disruptive is important. Alexander 
et al. introduced this distinction to ensure that 
the popular narrative moves away from viewing 
protestors as violent unprovoked agitators, in an 
effort to be ‘more sympathetic to protesters and 
to the history of protest’.42 International literature 
Figure 4: Peaceful and violent/disorderly protests between 2013 and 2017 (n=4391)
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2017).
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suggests that the likelihood of an event leading 
to violence is influenced by several factors, 
including actions or a lack of action on the part 
of both protestors and other roleplayers (such 
as the police or the party the protest is aimed 
at). Examples include heavy-handed policing 
practices or a lack of responsiveness by the 
relevant government department.43  
Location of protests
The events in the PPVM database were 
analysed by type of location, in other words, 
whether they took place in metropolitan, 
urban or rural areas.44 Two-thirds (67%) of the 
incidents took place in metro areas, while 17% 
and 16% took place in urban and rural areas 
respectively. Metro areas often experience 
challenges because of rapid urbanisation, higher 
population density and migration.45 Exceptional 
growth of the metros gives rise to increased 
demand for basic municipal services and other 
socio-economic rights such as housing, land, 
healthcare, education, infrastructure, transport, 
employment and security.  
Urbanised provinces are predominantly the 
location of most protest events. Figure 5 below 
shows that almost one-third of all events 
took place in Gauteng (31%), followed by the 
Western Cape (20%), KwaZulu-Natal (16%) and 
the Eastern Cape (14%). These provinces are 
the most highly populated and most urbanised, 
and therefore contain the largest metro areas. 
The Northern Cape experienced the lowest 
percentage of protest and strike action (1%), 
closely behind the Free State (2%), Mpumalanga 
(4%), North West (5%) and Limpopo (7%). 
These proportions remain largely unchanged 
even where strike action (which favours largely 
industrialised provinces) is excluded from the 
analysis to examine whether provincial patterns 
of non-labour related community protest differ. 
Some locations experienced a higher frequency 
of protest action than others. One of the 
simplest yet most effective ways to analyse data 
spatially is through mapping. The frequency 
of protests at different locations can be 
measured over time to yield so-called protest 
‘hotspots’.46 Hotspot analysis can be done to 
look at patterns of distribution in protest for a 
specific moment in time, and can also be used 
to determine any changes in hotspots over time. 
For instance, hotspot maps can show changes 
year-on-year or month-on-month, or can 
visualise data for a particular election period. 
The formation of hotspots illustrates that certain 
areas experience persistent protest action. 
Hotspot analysis is therefore a useful planning 
and monitoring tool to facilitate targeted and 
sustained interventions in areas where protests 
occur frequently.
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2017).
Northern Cape 1%
Free State 2%
Gauteng 31%Western Cape 20%
KwaZulu-Natal 16%
Eastern Cape 14% Limpopo 7%
Mpumalanga 4%
North West 5%
Figure 5: Provincial spread of PPVM events, 2013 to 2017 (n=4391)
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The map below shows the Gauteng protest 
hotspots that were calculated using PPVM data 
between January 2013 and March 2018.47 With 
geographic information system (GIS) software, 
protests were clustered within a 2.5km radius 
to estimate where most protest hotspots are 
located. The intensity of the hotspots was based 
on the frequency of protests at locations, using 
statistical calculation methods such as kernel 
density estimates.48 Areas on the map coloured 
in dark blue have the highest proportion of 
such incidents, while the yellow areas have the 
lowest. Areas with no colouring presented no 
such incidents. 
The map highlights that the location of a protest 
matters because social actions occur in some 
or other location.49 Most protests take place 
because of a grievance that persists or arises in 
a certain locale. For example, a community may 
protest because of water shortages in a specific 
area. The location of the protest is often the 
actual community or it can take place at 
the location of the delivery agent, e.g. the 
municipal offices. The protest can also move 
between locations. All efforts should be made 
to capture not only the location of the protest 
but also the nature of the protest and how 
it advances. 
As a result of the importance of the location 
of protests, one can hypothesise that most 
political and collective actions centre around 
‘place-based interests’.50 Future research 
should examine why a protest takes place in 
one location but not in another. Furthermore, 
it is useful to understand why one group may 
protest over water shortages but another 
group not, faced with similar circumstances. 
These research questions require complex, 
multi-stage, nuanced, and in-depth analysis. 
Source: ISS Protest and Public Violence Monitor (2018).
Map 1: Gauteng spread of events in terms of peaceful and violent, 2013 to 2017
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Concluding remarks
A comprehensive understanding of protest 
action necessitates the study of a wide scope 
of collective action including, but not limited 
to, protests aimed at municipalities and other 
narrow community interests. The PPVM is the 
only local, publicly accessible information portal 
that captures all forms of protest, disorder 
and public violence associated with social and 
economic discontent. Its findings therefore 
present an important contribution to what we 
know about the frequency and nature of protest 
and discontent.
The findings emerging from the PPVM data 
illustrate how wide-ranging protest grievances 
are, and how geographically widespread they 
are. Contrary to widely held opinion, the majority 
of grievances resulting in protest action are not 
about basic municipal-level service delivery 
issues, but include concerns about safety, 
education, employment and other broader 
socio-economic rights. While most protest 
is aimed at the state, the number of events 
mounted against the private sector in the form 
of strikes or business practices is significant. 
Preliminary hotspot analysis suggests that the 
likelihood of escalation of protest action into 
violence is dependent on the frequency of 
protests in a place (highlighting the possible lack 
of resolution of issues) as well as the role played 
by parties such as the police, leaders or officials. 
Further research should focus on this. 
The PPVM has its share of data challenges, 
and the project is adapting to address these 
concerns. For example, the PPVM data sources 
are being expanded to curb a dependency 
on media reporting. To this end, the ISS 
has developed a smartphone application to 
augment existing data sources. The Protest 
Reporter app allows members of the public to 
report incidents directly to the PPVM database, 
using a smartphone. It is available on both the 
Android and iPhone app stores, free of charge. 
In May and June, this mobile phone application 
was tested among community activists in 
selected protest hotspots in Gauteng.51 
Should the pilot prove to be successful, the 
application will be rolled out nationwide. The 
speed and success of the roll-out will depend 
on available capacity and financial resources, 
as well as the quality of partnerships with civil 
society organisations, academic institutions and 
government agencies. 
The complex nature of protest requires more 
nuanced research into different forms of 
discontent, their impact, outcomes (whether 
positive or negative) and their perceived success 
or failure. A better understanding of protest 
could and should assist with the development 
of evidence-based policy to ensure the 
formulation of more appropriate responses by 
various role players such as municipalities, law 
enforcement agencies, political parties and 
community activists. This approach may reduce 
and prevent forms of violence associated with 
certain protests, and may better equip the 
SAPS to respond to protests, including those 
that are aimed at the SAPS itself. 
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Appendix 1: A summary of grievance type working definitions used for PPVM
Business 
practice
Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at private sector services or costs or 
access to markets/job opportunities
Corruption/ 
governance
Any protest or gathering organised to highlight allegations of corruption or 
mismanagement by any public or private sector entity
Crime/policing Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at crime-related services or against 
policing practices/action, including vigilantism
Demarcation Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at the re-establishment of municipal 
boundaries
Education Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at education-related services or costs, 
whether primary, secondary or tertiary
Political/ 
elections
Any protest or gathering including internal party political issues, or where 
a political party protests against another, or where the protest or gathering 
interferes with usual electoral/IEC practices and processes e.g. during 
campaigning. This category also includes political attacks (any violent or 
attempted violent attempt or actual killing of a person of political importance). 
It can include members of labour organisations since 2016.
Housing/land Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at housing or land-related services, 
including evictions from buildings or invasions targeting the issue of access to 
land, or land disputes
International 
causes
Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at global issues such as human rights 
abuses or political causes
Labour Any strike action, march or gathering organised by workers or trade unions to 
highlight labour disputes by any public or private sector entity
Municipal 
services
Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at basic municipal services, including 
grievances against ward councillors for non-response, but excluding 
allegations of corruption
Socio-
economic
Any protest or gathering aimed at any socio-economic right not specifically 
mentioned in any other category, focused often at marginalised groups or 
human rights abuses such as equal rights, or ending abuse, or discrimination 
campaigns, or jobs campaigns, or healthcare services
Transport Any protest or gathering aimed mainly at transport-related services, including 
public transport, tolling of roads but excluding transport issues falling under 
the Department of Basic Education
Xenophobia Any protest or gathering, attempt or attack based on any form of 
discrimination or violence against people due to their ethnic, linguistic or 
national background. It may be against immigrants or refugees, but it may 
also be against South Africans from other villages, ethnic groups, religions 
or languages. Even if such incidents intersect with other forms of crime – 
violence, looting, threats, or attacks – they are recorded. However, only if this 
category is the main motivation of the collective action will it be recorded as a 
main grievance type. 
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